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Abstract 
 
This interview with John D. Caputo conducted by T. Wilson Dickinson discusses the 
implications of the event for the philosophy of education. It addresses various aporias the 
event poses for academic standards, protocols of writing, teaching as formation or 
transformation, the post-secular, the new technologies, the old versus the new asceticism 
in the face of the environmental crisis. 
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Education as Event: A Conversation 
with John D. Caputo1 
 
T. Wilson Dickinson:  Decades ago, 
Heidegger presciently observed that 
information – and the positivist episte-
mological framework that accompanies 
it – was coming to serve as a 
constricting limit for thinking (Heidegger 
1996: 29). This constriction does not 
seem to be due merely to some kind of 
cognitive mistake or conviction, but it 
seems to be constantly reinforced by the 
practices of the university, extending 
from the classroom practice of lecture 
and examination, to the self-
understanding of scholars as researchers 
(Heidegger 2002: 64). It seems that one 
of the more common forms of resistance 
to this tendency is to counter this 
secular model of the research university 
with a more confessional approach to 
education. So rather than simply serving 
as a conduit for the accumulation and 
communication of information, 
universities redirect their concern toward 
the formation of students. Might there be 
a third way forward, or one that 
hauntingly inhabits the boundaries 
between these secular and religious 
options? Could you imagine a sort of 
post-secular university? 
John D. Caputo: The first question for 
me would be: what is a ‘secular’ 
university? Today this word means a 
person or an institution not affiliated with 
or sponsored by a church or religious 
organization. We define it negatively but 
it is very positive. It is very important in 
the political order, where the constitution 
restrains the government from 
																																								 																				
1 The following interview first appeared in JCRT 
(Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory) 12. 2. 
Fall 2012. We are grateful to John D. Caputo, T. 
Wilson Dickinson, and Victor Taylor for 
permission to reprint this interview here. 
supporting a particular confessional 
religion. We do not want to be ‘post-
secular’ if that would mean undermining 
that constitutional restraint. In that 
sense, the Christian Right, and their 
claim that the United States is a 
Christian nation, could claim the mantle 
of post-secular. That is very dangerous 
and I do not want to be post-secular in 
that sense. Again, when it comes to 
universities, citizens without a religious 
affiliation have the right to study free 
from religious proselytizing or mandatory 
religious practices. So in the practical 
order, this word ‘secular’ protects us, 
even as it allows religiously minded 
people to found religious institutions 
from their own resources. Of course, this 
is easily said but carrying it out in reality 
involves difficult negotiations. 
But as a philosophical theologian there 
is another sense of ‘secular’ and ‘religion’ 
that interests me, and in this sense I 
think the university should not try to be 
‘secular’ and should expose itself to a 
certain ‘religious’ impulse. In fact, I think 
that if it does not, it will destroy itself. I 
would go so far as to say that, in this 
sense again, not only the university but 
also the political order should be ‘post-
secular’. Here everything depends upon 
seeing what I mean by ‘religion’, since I 
obviously do not mean ‘confessional’ 
religion. What I mean is what I call the 
religion of the ‘event’, a word that 
circulates felicitously among the great 
philosophers of our times. Without the 
‘event’ I would run the risk of forgetting 
that I exist, as Johannes Climacus 
quipped. We must not forget the event, 
for it is the event that ‘forms’ or 
‘transforms’ our existence. So if we 
search for a third possibility between 
secular ‘information’ and religious 
‘formation’, this would be the possibility 
of the event. The crucial distinction for 
me is between the event and the lack of 
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the event. To be post-secular means that 
I do not want to lack the event, where 
this lack is what ‘secular’ would mean for 
me. 
Let me add a word about ‘event’. This 
word is all over contemporary philosophy 
but I mean it in Derrida’s sense of the 
coming of something we cannot see 
coming, the coming of the unexpected, 
unprojected, unprogrammed, which of 
course we hope will make everything 
new but may make everything worse. 
With the coming of the event, things are 
reopened, reinvented, undergo a 
paradigm shift, a new being, and this 
happens everywhere, in history and 
everyday life, in philosophy, in art, in 
science. The Copernican Revolution, 
Picasso’s cubism, the recent ‘Arab 
Spring’, these were transformative and 
unpredicted. Of course, we cannot make 
events happen – we cannot even see 
them coming. But we can prepare the 
conditions under which they happen by 
keeping things relatively unstable, in a 
state of optimal disequilibrium, not too 
much but enough, and this requires 
judgment and discernment. That I think 
is the condition in systems theory where 
the system is capable of innovation and 
reinvention without simply collapsing. If 
the system is too tight, too ordered, 
nothing new can happen. I admit this is 
risky business. But the point is that 
playing it safe all the time is also risky 
business – it risks the prevention of the 
future, of the event. Nothing is safe. 
Everything is risky. Now having said this, 
we can ask, is this structural exposure to 
the event not a perfect way to describe 
the institution in general and in 
particular educational institutions – the 
administration, the curriculum, teaching 
‘methods’, testing and evaluation, 
everything that goes on in education. A 
teacher gives a class, or maybe just 
makes a comment in class, and a 
student’s life is changed. The teacher 
does not know she did this, and at the 
time neither does the student. That is the 
event. 
WD: I am thinking here not just about 
the idea of such a university, but about 
its practices. In The Weakness of God 
you drew a distinction not simply 
between an overly abstract theoretical 
reason and practical reason, but within 
practical reason you differentiated 
Aristotelian practical judgment (or 
phronesis) from the heart (or kardia) of 
the disciple of Christ. Whereas the 
former is capable of adroitly applying a 
general schema to a particular situation, 
the latter gives oneself over to ‘the 
demands of singularity’ (Caputo 2006: 
142-3). So while the pedagogy of 
formation might exceed the limitations of 
information, it seems to still lead to 
some kind of conformity. I wonder what 
a pedagogy of radical transformation 
might look like? Is it possible to speak 
about the practices of a pedagogy of the 
heart? 
JC: I do not know if you intended just 
now to use the word ‘transformation’ 
instead of ‘formation’, or even in contrast 
to formation. If so, I approve. I think that 
the university must provide the milieu for 
the event and therefore I would prefer 
not to say a place of ‘formation’. It must 
allow the event to happen, which is why I 
myself would speak of ‘transformation’ 
rather than ‘formation’. I think ‘form’ and 
‘formation’ work against the event. The 
coming or incoming of the event – in 
French, this is l’invention de l’événement 
– is the occasion of a transformation. So 
instead of ‘forming’ ‘habits’ (literally 
‘havings’) we have to do with 
transforming happenings, with events, 
and what we seek is a certain readiness 
for the event, which is paradoxical since 
the event is what we cannot see coming 
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and hence something for which we 
cannot be ready. We must make ready 
for what we cannot be ready. 
Although I see a certain limit in Aristotle, 
still it was Aristotle who first taught us 
about this aporia and in this sense he 
was the first philosopher of the event. 
The phronimos is not merely the man 
(and we know he did not mean women) 
who knows the ‘rule’ and can ‘apply’ it. If 
the situation is rule-governed, a machine, 
a computer, a robot could apply it. The 
phronimos is the one who knows what to 
do when faced with an idiosyncratic 
situation, when the rules do not simply 
apply but have to be ‘reinvented’ in order 
to respond to the demands of the 
‘singular’ situation. I have always thought 
of myself as some kind of an Aristotelian 
on this point, a dissident or heretical 
Aristotelian, to be sure, with all kinds of 
reservations about the conservativism by 
which we are threatened in Aristotle. But 
I am always trying to reinvent this 
phronimos, to expose a ‘more radical 
phronesis’ (Caputo 1987: 262). One way I 
do so is to say this phronimos fellow is a 
little too cool, too smart, too aristocratic, 
and that he needs a little less ‘insight’ 
and a little more ‘heart’, to be ‘melted’ by 
the demands of the other, not simply to 
coolly see what the demands of the 
situation are. There is nothing ‘unmanly’ 
in being tender. Now the ‘heart’ is the 
Biblical model, the prophetic model, and 
it shows up in the Christian ‘Fathers’ of 
the Church – here we must add ‘sic!’ – 
above all in St. Augustine’s Confessions. 
Its opposite is ‘hardness of heart’. That, I 
think, breaks the grip of the elitist and 
conservative streak in Aristotle and turns 
our hearts (and our minds) to what Paul 
calls ta me onta, the little nothings and 
bodies, the homeless and the hopeless, 
the ‘rogues’ and marginalized who never 
make an appearance in Aristotle’s ethics 
(except as ‘slaves’ and ‘women’). 
So if we say the university must be a 
scene of the event, not a place of 
formation, then it must take every 
precaution not to the prevent the event. 
This means it risks a certain anarchy, an 
open-endedness of thought – the right to 
ask any question – and a proliferation of 
practices, a rainbow coalition, as Jesse 
Jackson says, of people of many different 
sorts, different cultures, etc. That is more 
easily accomplished with the resources 
of the larger urban universities. 
Furthermore, something like this is much 
more likely to happen when ‘information’ 
flows freely, across closed borders. So I 
do not think we should engage in 
caricatures about big universities – the 
large state university, large classes, no 
personal contact, a degree-processing 
factory, as opposed to a small 
confessional college, more intimate, 
more concerned with the personal 
character of the students – or even 
about ‘information’. We would also need 
to rethink ‘information’ beyond 
Heidegger’s criticism. I agree it was 
extraordinarily prescient of Heidegger to 
single out this word – not only did he 
thematize the ‘T’ in ‘IT’, but also the ‘I’ – 
but we cannot forget how reactionary 
Heidegger was about democracy and 
technology, and we need to recognize 
how much democracy requires the free 
flow of information. Furthermore, in 
quantum physics, ‘information’ may turn 
out to be the very nature of the universe. 
It may be that on the most elemental 
level, the most basic units of existence 
are bits of information, even as in genetic 
theory, the very basis of life lies in some 
kind of information system. That is what 
is so prophetic in the way that the young 
Derrida singled out the paradigm of a 
generalized archi-‘writing’, coded 
differential systems, which led him to the 
Heideggerian heresy that a ‘techne’ lies 
at the very heart of the ‘physis’ Heidegger 
celebrated. Maybe information is an 
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auto-deconstructing system of trans-
formation and there is no difference at 
all between them. 
But to return to the issue that you are 
concerned with in this question, no 
college or university can neglect the 
‘heart’ because it cannot neglect the 
event, which is its heart. You see this 
quite vividly in Quaker and Anabaptist 
colleges, institutions of distinguished 
academic achievement that also have a 
heart. I remember once that a man 
named John Coleman, then president of 
Haverford College outside Philadelphia, 
took a leave of absence in order to 
spend time working as a trash collector, 
reminding himself and everybody around 
him of the privileged circumstances of 
most academic communities. This 
extraordinary act also reminds us also of 
the mission of community colleges and 
public urban institutions to serve the 
least privileged students. Our institutions 
must be open-ended and if ‘open 
admissions’ has not worked, we need a 
massive commitment of resources to 
prepare the least advantaged to meet 
admission standards. The Christian Right 
would object to this, of course, on the 
grounds that they do not want the 
Sermon on the Mount to mean that we 
are going to raise their taxes. 
WD: This distinction between information 
and formation is quite obviously a 
heuristic schematization that easily 
breaks down. Foucault, for example, 
traced the genealogical roots of modern 
disciplines of knowledge to the monastic 
technologies and Christian spiritual 
exercises. He often cites none other than 
Jean-Baptiste de La Salle as an 
intermediary figure between the ascetic 
attention to detail in the ‘mystique of the 
everyday’ and the ‘discipline of the 
minute’ that organized ‘the school, the 
barracks, the hospital or the workshop’ 
(Foucault 1995: 140). What seems to be 
at stake, then, is not an opposition 
between an overly theoretical way of 
proceeding and one that is practical, but 
a complex and contested differential 
field of practices. As your own education 
has its roots in De La Salle’s order of 
Christian Brothers, I wonder if this 
historical connection was something that 
was readily apparent to you as a student 
and then a teacher, or do you see a stark 
divide between the life of the academic 
and that of the religious life? And on a 
more personal note, how have these 
various formations come to inform your 
work? 
JC: Now you have exposed my allergy to 
the word ‘formation’ and why I prefer to 
speak of ‘transformability’ to signify an 
alternate order of practices. Yes, 
‘practices’ is not a panacea. We must 
distinguish among different sorts of 
practices, as we have already done by 
distinguishing phronesis and kardia. I 
was born in 1940 into a church that had 
not changed in any significant way in 
four hundred years and, as you point out, 
I entered a Catholic religious order. That 
was in 1958, the year that Pius XII died 
and was succeeded by John XXIII. This 
seemed at the time to be the beginning 
of the end of a very conservative period 
in the Church. My novitiate life was, if I 
may say so, a very ‘formative’ experience 
for me, quite literally, especially since we 
were still steeped in the culture of the 
pre-Vatican II church. What will interest 
you to learn is that, in a religious order, 
the time spent preparing for entering the 
active ministry is called ‘formation’ and 
the novitiate is called a ‘house of 
formation’. And they mean it! We might 
think of this as a Nietzschean camel 
stage or alternately, as you indicate, a 
very Foucauldian space and time. The 
hours of each day, the days of each 
week, are rigorously articulated and 
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structured, even as the grounds are 
walled in. Here the young person is 
‘formed’ in the ‘spirit’ of the ‘Order’ by 
means of obedience to the ‘Rule’. This is 
quite like a military boot camp, as your 
reference to Foucault on the ‘barracks’ 
indicates, and it works best with eighteen 
year olds. The individual novice is 
ordered, formed, disciplined, by a blanket 
of practices and micro-powers, affecting 
everything from what one reads and 
studies to clothing, a change of name, 
bodily posture, modes of expression, diet, 
table manners, including the very 
condiments one uses at meals, 
prescribed times when one is allowed to 
speak, even relaxation. One never relaxes 
the rule but the rule provides for fixed 
times of relaxation, where as a matter of 
religious obedience, one is told to relax. 
Of course, the idea, the ‘form’, is the 
imitatio Christi. They want to engender 
someone Christ-like not produce a robot, 
but it is a massive disciplinary operation 
which reaches down into the bones, 
‘forming’ ‘habits’ that last a lifetime. 
Foucault was interested in the way De la 
Salle transcribed analogous practices to 
the modern elementary school, the 
‘distribution of bodies’ in ‘grades’, 
arranged by age, gender, etc. At the time, 
we were very proud of the place ‘St. La 
Salle’ held in the history of education, 
and in fact the American ‘Christian 
Brothers’ today run first-rate schools. I 
would say two things about this. First, as 
I have been saying, I would distinguish 
the practices of ‘formation’ in the 
singular, which suggests a single form to 
be inculcated – Christ, the warrior, the 
good Christian child, the good citizen, the 
good socialist, etc. – from the practices 
of ‘transformation’, which suggests a kind 
of endless transformability or 
reinventability. The latter for me is closer 
to the ‘event’. Schools organized about 
the paradigm of transformability, not 
houses of formation, will be more 
welcoming and open-ended places. (In 
fact, the places where teachers expected 
to ‘form’ students are called ‘normal’ 
schools, normalizing, inculcating norms.) 
Now the baroque, counter-Reformation 
pre-Vatican world in which I grew up – 
four centuries of Catholicism from the 
Council of Trent to the opening of 
Vatican II in October, 1962 – 
disappeared quite quickly. Today, the 
Catholic Church in the United States and 
Western Europe, as well as the religious 
orders, are today in a state of crisis. 
Orders like the Christian Brothers, which 
are ‘active orders’, have abandoned old 
models, which were taken from the 
‘contemplative orders’, and have tried to 
‘reinvent’ themselves for a modern or 
rather postmodern world. They have, I 
would say, abandoned the paradigm of 
monastic ‘formation’ for one more suited 
to contemporary life, but this may be too 
little too late. They are beset with a crisis 
of numbers that may finally see them all 
but disappear. 
That would be a loss, and this brings me 
to my second point. The old monastic 
model of formation and the 
‘technologies’ it deployed were construed 
around a ‘vow’, a promise, an affirmation, 
which I would now describe as a 
response to an event. So while I shed no 
tears over abandoning the old 
disciplinary system and its ascetic ideal, 
which I think is a world well lost for all 
but a very few people, the loss of these 
orders will mean the loss of the religious 
passion that drives the members of 
these orders to run schools and shelters 
and clinics in neighborhoods from which 
the rest of us keep a safe distance. It is 
these people above all else who serve ta 
me onta. That is also where celibacy 
(voluntary not mandatory!) has a role to 
play. If you have children to raise, it is 
very difficult to live and work in such 
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dangerous neighborhoods, the way 
celibate priests, nuns and brothers do. 
The De La Salle Brothers take a fourth 
religious vow, the Christian education of 
the poor. They renounce the choice of 
the priesthood in order to be completely 
committed to teaching, undistracted by 
the priestly duty to administer the 
sacraments. For them teaching is a 
religious vocation, a vow they have taken, 
their ‘apostolate’ or calling, and not only 
a job. That is the most precious thing I 
have learned from them, and it is 
something I still believe, although I would 
now use the word ‘religious’ in a more 
open-ended way. Here you clearly see 
the workings of the event and of people 
galvanized by the event. The 
disappearance of these people means 
that schools that serve the poorest of the 
poor are being closed and increasingly 
scarce resources are shifted to the 
prosperous suburban schools. 
Furthermore, the nuns are the most 
radical women in the Catholic Church 
today, women who both are deeply 
religious and acutely conscious of the 
violent patriarchy of the Catholic 
hierarchy. The bishops know that and 
they don’t trust them and well they 
should not. Some nuns are being 
ordained in open defiance of the 
Church’s prohibition – a kind of Christian 
disobedience, not civil but ecclesiastical 
– which is at least a first step in 
overturning the violent misogyny of the 
Church. Perhaps these nuns will be the 
Rosa Parks of Catholicism. 
WD: In On Religion you reject the division 
that is often drawn between the secular 
and the religious on the grounds that it 
appeals to the largely cognitive 
opposition drawn between reason and 
faith. Instead, taking a page out of 
Augustine’s Confessions, you propose 
that religion is about passion and love 
(more specifically you appeal to the 
poetics of salt, which is always a little 
befuddling to my students when I teach 
the book in my introductory classes).2 If 
this is the case, then even the seemingly 
secular practices of the classroom and 
academic life could be interpreted in 
religious terms. This is also something 
that Augustine does throughout the 
pages of the Confessions – interrogating 
the manner in which intellectual 
disciplines shaped his desires. This leads 
me to wonder, then, what is it I love 
when I undergo the typical practices of 
academic life? How do the specific 
practices of the classroom educate the 
desires of our students? What are 
different disciplinary mechanisms (tenure 
committees, accreditation reviews, and 
peer-reviewed journals) training us to 
love? 
JC: I appreciate the irony of your 
question. You return us, in the context of 
the schools, to one of Derrida’s most 
famous aporias, between justice and the 
law, but now the aporia is set between 
our love of philosophical and theological 
searching and the tenure committee, 
which is the law. Let us say, the aporia of 
the philosophical and theological quest 
and the quest for a job and tenure. So let 
us go back to the event. Teaching and 
writing, reading and learning, teachers 
and students, all are about the event. We 
may even speak of a pedagogy of the 
event. Everything is about the event, 
inside or outside the academy, religion, 
everyday life, in sacred space or secular 
space. Indeed, since the event as I have 
been discussing it has an inherently 
religious force, I would say there is no 
strictly ‘secular’ space, if that would 
mean a space without the event. For me, 
all the ‘professions’ – medicine, law, 
education – concern the event. The 
																																								 																				
2 See especially Caputo (2001), ‘Religion is for 
Lovers’ in On Religion, New York: Routledge. 
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professions are made up of people who 
have been ‘called’ by one event or 
another; they are vocations, callings. As I 
have just said, I have no hesitation in 
calling them ‘religious vocations’. I once 
was sure I had a religious vocation in the 
strict or narrow sense. But I have come 
to see that I had, that we all have, or 
should have, a religious vocation in the 
terms that I have been discussing, which 
means being visited by the grace of the 
event, in any of several orders. We can 
see this in the legal profession, where 
the event that galvanizes the law is the 
passion for justice, which give rise to the 
aporiae of the passion for justice and the 
rule or force of law so powerfully 
elaborated by Derrida. The law deals with 
matters of life and death, in the most 
literal sense, and so it deals with sacred 
or solemn matters, which is the event. 
The same aporias are found there as in 
all the professions. In the medical 
profession, the event that insists in the 
name of ‘healing’, to which they all take 
an ‘oath’, by which everyone in that 
profession has been summoned (I am 
speaking optatively, I am dreaming), has 
to contend with a monster of laws – of 
hospital regulations, professional codes 
of conduct, health insurance company 
regulations, malpractice litigation, 
hierarchical conflicts among hospital 
administrators, physicians and nurses, 
and even the laws of the market, so that 
hospitals now advertise for patients. I 
have been invited to speak several times 
by nurses and nursing educators, and 
they have helped me see the religious 
quality of the medical vocation of the 
nurse. The nurse is relatively low on the 
hospital power chart but no one is 
closer, more intimately involved, with 
patients, with the singularity of the 
patient’s situation, which lies below the 
rules up above. Those who nurse the 
dying in a hospice have a palpably 
religious calling, whether or not the 
institution has any relationship to a 
confessional ‘religion’, as many hospitals 
in fact do. In Great Britain, in fact, the 
nurse is still called ‘sister’, and the garb 
of a nun and of a nurse are similar. You 
will recall that when the ministry of Jesus 
is first introduced in the New Testament, 
it is said he came ‘teaching and healing’. 
The questions you are raising arise from 
an experience of the same aporias, the 
same structural conflict between the 
events to which we in the university are 
all responding and the monster of laws, 
the flow of the academic power chart 
from the administration to the students, 
the requirements placed upon the 
students for graduation, the ‘grading’ 
system, etc., and upon the faculty to 
meet the standards of tenure and 
promotion. This is the conflict between 
our vocation, our religious vocation, and 
the disciplinary system, the distribution 
of micro-power across the bodies who 
make up the university, the administered 
society of the university. On the one 
hand, I am writing from my heart, writing 
something because my life is at stake, 
because I am confounded by the 
mysteries of my existence, and on the 
other hand, I need another publication 
for tenure. I am doing both of these 
things at the same time. Is that possible? 
It seems not. I am not sure. Maybe we 
regularly do things like that, something 
like the Knight of Faith who looks for all 
the world like a tax collector. 
I am not sure I can improve upon 
Derrida’s solution to such aporias, which 
is to say that we do not solve them but 
move in the distance between the two 
extremes. We must at one and the same 
time both prove ourselves according to 
the protocols of the university and also 
transform them from within. There are 
many experimental institutions, not 
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enough, which treat the rules with a 
measured suspicion, but those are at 
best limited solutions. They are not going 
to replace mainstream institutions, which 
cannot be replaced but can be renewed 
by inventive administrators and faculty 
who can devise new unprogrammable 
‘programs’, new ways of meeting 
requirements, new ‘requirements’ that 
are duties without duties, new courses 
not merely in content but in method, 
new courses that do not proceed as a 
simple matter of ‘course’. We must find 
new ways to weaken the protocols 
without jettisoning them, new ways to 
break down the barriers between the 
disciplines and the colleges, etc. One 
danger I see is the growing 
professionalization of people who run the 
universities, a separate culture of 
upwardly mobile professional 
administrators who move from university 
to university in search of higher 
positions. They do not arise from the 
faculty and return to the faculty and so 
they risk insulating themselves from the 
event, which can only take place in the 
classroom, which is the heart of the 
university. 
So the idea is not so much to eliminate 
these aporias but to make them maxims, 
the impossible conditions under which 
we must make something possible. We 
cannot, we ought not to try to separate 
justice and the law, the gift and the 
economy, the event and the systems in 
which it is always already found. Instead, 
we want to make them porous to each 
other. The aporias are inescapable, 
irreducible; we could even say 
‘structural’, albeit in the paradoxical 
sense that the structure is de-
structuring, that the event prevents the 
structure from closing over, from 
enclosing the event by submitting the 
event to rules, to the program. That 
means that the aporias are openings, 
opportunities, albeit risky ones. Of 
course, churches, courts, hospitals, 
museums and schools are structures, 
institutions, economies, jobs, and they 
need money and they need rules. But 
there must always be something unruly 
about the rules, some anarchic energy, 
some event, for these institutions contain 
something they cannot contain, 
something uncontainable, which is the 
event. The justice is always found in the 
opening, the crack, the crevice. The rules 
must be ‘plastic’, to borrow Catherine 
Malabou’s word; they must be 
welcoming, open-ended. Everyone must 
understand that the task is not to apply 
the rule but to reinvent it, that the 
individual is never a ‘case’ that ‘falls 
under’ (cadere, casus) a rule, but the rule 
is a finger pointing at a moon of 
singularity. 
This can all be written down quite 
elegantly, of course, but the reality is 
never as elegant. I spent over twenty 
years on promotion and tenure 
committees and time and again we were 
presented with idiosyncratic situations. 
How do you evaluate the ‘research’ of a 
professor in the performing arts if, 
instead of writing critical essays the 
professor actually performs, as an actor 
or a director? Is a published book of 
poetry, or a text book, ‘published 
research’? Those are the easy questions. 
The hard one is, how do we truly 
evaluate a teacher? How do you measure 
whether the students have been touched 
by the event of a teacher who has herself 
been transformed by the event? If this 
happens at all, it may not happen until 
many years later when someone realizes 
how a teacher has changed her life. But 
we cannot let such impossible 
conundrums turn us into ‘beautiful 
souls’, as Hegel called them, too 
beautiful for the harshness of the world. 
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WD: In my own work, I have suggested 
that the writings of a number of 
continental philosophers, like 
Kierkegaard and Derrida, can be 
interpreted as contemporary trans-
formations of ancient and Christian 
spiritual exercises and technologies of 
the self.3 So rather than being nihilistic 
theorists, they could be thought of as 
practitioners of a radical pedagogy. In 
what way do you think it is possible to 
recover and re-interpret these resources 
of philosophy and theology, and in what 
way would such a turn to the past run 
the risk of repeating its mistakes and 
shortcomings? 
JC: I like this expression ‘radical 
pedagogy’ and I think you do well to 
single out Derrida and Kierkegaard as 
prototypes. They are the most important 
philosophers in my work as well, in my 
own search for something radical: 
Kierkegaard because of his articulation 
of the ‘single individual’, which we today 
call ‘singularity’, and Derrida because of 
the account of the event, of the coming 
of the singularity of the other, as a basic 
structure of our experience. They are for 
me the prototypes of thinkers who write 
from the passion of life, who are touched 
by a transformative event, and that I 
think has been the source of our shared 
interest in them. They also share 
something in common that I very much 
treasure – they are both comic-tragic 
writers, both laughing through their tears, 
which I think the only style that is 
congenial to the event, that does not 
																																								 																				
3 See T. Wilson Dickinson (2011), ‘Repeating, Not 
Simply Recollecting, Repetition: Kierkegaard’s 
Ethical Exercises’, Sophia 50, 4: 657-675; (2012) 
‘Teaching with Fear and Trembling: On the 
Classroom as a Space of Dramatic and 
Bewildering Trial’, Journal of Cultural and 
Religious Theory 12, 2; (2011) Specters of Truth: 
Exercising Philosophy and Theology, PhD diss., 
Syracuse University.  
prevent the event (and also makes for 
good teachers). The event is the most 
deadly serious thing of all and so it can 
be approached only or best in the comic 
mode, as when Climacus tells us about 
the man who accepts an invitation to 
dinner with the proviso that he is not in 
the meantime killed by a slate falling off 
a roof as he passes by. Everyone laughs 
but he is ‘deadly serious’. The comic is 
the incognito of the religious. The style of 
their work is of course completely 
incommensurable with modernity and 
the rule of method, which is why we have 
both found in them echoes of 
premodern figures like Augustine, where 
the passion of the event is palpable and 
the rules of modernity had not yet been 
formed. I am not saying that Augustine or 
early Christian writers were humorists, of 
course, but that they write from the 
heart, I would say ‘autobiographically’, 
not as a strict literary genre but in the 
sense that they were not writing papers 
to deliver at conferences or for the 
advancement of academic careers. They 
were writing with their blood about 
matters of life and death. The earliest 
theologies were forged in the closest 
collaboration with the communities of 
faith, as opposed to the gulf that today 
separates the ‘bishop’, the official 
teacher of the faith, and the ‘theologian’, 
who is writing books and papers for 
fellow theologians and for tenure. 
Kierkegaard exposed the fraudulence of 
the academic setting in which 
philosophy and theology are housed in 
modern times and he recalls for us the 
apostolic passion of Christian antiquity. 
He once went so far as to question the 
Christian credentials of anyone who is 
not martyred! 
You ask about dangers inherent in such 
a retrieval of the ancients. For me, in 
every case the danger is always that we 
will prevent the event, that mundane 
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forces, the powers of the world, will 
prevent the event, and so it is worth 
contrasting the different dangers in 
Christian antiquity and in the work of 
Kierkegaard. The times are different, the 
task is different, and so the danger, the 
forces of the world, are different. The 
early theologians were engaged in an 
apostolic struggle to construct a memory 
of Jesus in a theological edifice that 
would house a way of life, a way of 
repeating Jesus in their life. As you have 
shown, they are writing from an 
existential passion, which is why we love 
them. The danger here – a danger to 
which I think they finally succumbed – 
was the institutionalization of their 
passion. I think they allowed their 
passion for the event that took place in 
the name of Jesus to freeze over into an 
obsession with the construction of 
‘Christianity’, with imposing doctrinal 
rectitude, as you have pointed out in 
your work. That allowed their theology, 
which is supposed to be a theology of 
the originating event, to devolve into 
heresiology. Although this may sound 
strange to orthodox ears, ‘Christianity’ 
was the mundane force that suppressed 
the event by which they were driven. 
Practically everything we know about the 
‘Gnostics’, for example, comes from 
citations in the writings of the people 
who were denouncing them as ‘heretics’, 
the old story of history being written by 
the winners. I think that the fear of 
heresy is the fear of the event. 
Kierkegaard, on the other hand, lived in 
an almost perfectly opposite time – not a 
church ‘militant’ but a church 
‘triumphant’, a post-Constantinian time – 
when Europeans thought they were all 
Christian. That led Kierkegaard to make 
his famous distinction between a 
fraudulent and complacent ‘Christen-
dom’, which is a power of this world, and 
a genuine apostolic ‘Christianity’, which 
still breathed with the breath of the 
event, where you would risk your life to 
be a Christian. So Kierkegaard did battle 
with the mundane powers of the Church 
and the politics of the modern university. 
Accordingly, Kierkegaard ran the 
opposite danger, and by the end of his 
life I think he succumbed to it, a deeply 
anti-institutional condemnation of the 
church and the university which leaves 
no room for any institution, along with an 
elitist distrust of modern democratic 
institutions that he shared with 
Nietzsche and Heidegger. I do not mean 
to set Derrida on a white horse at this 
point but I have to say that Derrida does 
not make either mistake. He is insistent 
about the inside/outside structure, about 
the roguishness of democracy, and 
about the need for ‘negotiations’, for 
moving in the space between justice and 
the law, events and institutions. He is a 
lover of heretical dissent while at the 
same time he can even say that 
deconstruction is a philosophy of 
institutions. Still, it pains me to oppose 
Kierkegaard and Derrida, because what I 
love about the two of them, what you 
and I both love, is that they pose to such 
a ‘scandal’ to the business as usual of 
philosophy and the university. Their very 
names are a summons to do things 
differently, to reinvent the university 
under the impulse of the event, which is 
itself a heresy to the spirit of objectivism 
that hovers over the university today. 
They are consciously, intentionally 
eccentric and incommensurable figures. 
That is why I love them both and will not 
choose between them. 
WD: In Against Ethics you drew a 
distinction between bodies and flesh – 
with the former designating the aspects 
of our existence that are characterized 
by intentionality, agency, and strength, 
while the latter is associated with that 
which is weak, vulnerable, and subject to 
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suffering (Caputo 1993: 203). You have 
used this distinction to criticize the 
philosophical and theological fantasy of a 
body without flesh, of a form of existence 
that is able to rid itself of its limitation, 
weakness, and vulnerability. Are there 
pedagogical practices that reinforce this 
fantasy, that imagine the professor to be 
an authoritative font of knowledge, that 
presume the classroom to be a place 
where fleshless intellects interface, 
where frailty and limitation are 
examined, graded, and if found wanting, 
failed? How might the body and the flesh 
remain integrated in the classroom? 
JC: When I write, and when I teach, I 
always want to touch the event, or rather 
to let the student or the reader be 
touched by the event, and so there is a 
‘homiletic’ element in my ‘pedagogy’, for 
which my writing has been criticized 
(instead of being congratulated). I want to 
evoke the event, to let the event happen, 
but of course I cannot and I do not want 
to abandon my ‘training’, my ‘formation’, 
in the ‘discipline’. I want to be faithful to 
the discipline while not allowing the 
discipline to prevent the event. First and 
foremost, it is the event that has 
assembled the students and the 
professors in the same classroom, that 
has assembled us as colleagues in the 
‘college’, meaning those who associate 
under a common calling, who have 
responded to the event. That is the 
‘religious’ dimension of the college or 
university. It is like a religious assembly, 
an ‘ekklesia’, meaning that it is the event 
that calls (kalein) and assembles the 
students and the professors who 
respond, who are the ones that are 
called together, the ekklesia. That is why, 
and we all know this, the teacher 
teaches by contagion, by contact, which 
means by touching. It is the evident fact 
that the teacher has been touched by 
the event that touches the students in 
turn. Teaching is a matter of being 
touched by the being-touched of the 
teacher, not mind to mind but flesh to 
flesh. 
As you can see I am putting the student 
and the teacher or professor in the same 
position, in the position of responding, of 
saying yes to something by which they 
have been touched, of receiving the 
event, rather than positioning the teacher 
as a sovereign subjectivity who has 
‘mastery’ of her field. This is the position 
of flesh not body, of the patient not the 
agent, of receptivity and responsiveness, 
of being exposed, vulnerable to the 
coming of something unforeseen. Of 
course, it is dangerous for the young 
teacher to assume such a posture 
because the sociology of the modern 
university is centered on a series of 
agencies, of teaching ‘effectiveness’, of 
having a mature research ‘program’, and 
having credentials that assure everyone 
that she is a ‘master’ and a ‘doctor’ of 
her field. But, the truth is that we serve 
the event, are in bonds to the event, and 
we are not a ‘master’, just as we are not 
a ‘doctor’ of the event but a patient. But 
confessing on such non-agency, 
receptivity and non-knowing is not a 
recommended course at a job interview 
or a conference presentation and it is 
not a path to tenure. At such times we 
are expected to be upright bodies not 
beings of flesh. The best advice I can give 
you on this point is this. For a long time, 
at least, this confession may be 
permitted only as an aside, an 
apostrophe, when for a moment, an 
Augenblick, in the midst of a lecture or a 
dialogue one notes, by the way, just in 
passing, as if this were not a serious 
point, almost as if we were joking (the 
comic as the incognito of the religious), 
that we none of us know who we are. 
Then we get back to ‘business’.  
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By the way, just as an aside, allow me to 
note in passing the presence here of 
what Derrida calls the implicit 
theologeme that accompanies this 
distinction between body and flesh. I am 
not modeling the teacher after a 
sovereign, strong God, a supreme ‘agent’ 
(actus purus) the governor of the 
universe, who creates things ex nihilo, 
which would in turn be the model of the 
‘magisterium’, the teaching authority of 
the church, as well as of the college, as 
an administered society, administered of 
course by the administration from the 
top down. The implicit theologeme is 
rather to think of the teacher as one who 
has received a ‘grace’, as a patient not 
an agent, who has said yes to a grace, 
who welcomes it, and that I think is not 
merely an analogy. It is the grace of the 
event. That is what ‘binds’ – if we accept 
the old and now questionable etymology 
of religion as re-ligare – the teacher and 
the student as such, and it is their 
common bond to the event, so that 
neither is a master. As you know, I do not 
think of either God or the event as an 
‘agent’, as ‘somebody’, ‘someone’, some 
‘thing’ doing something, but rather as a 
happening, as the happening of a 
promise and a memory, which is wispy 
even spectral thing. Both agent and 
patient need to be rethought in terms of 
the grammatology of the middle voice, as 
we have learned from Heidegger. That 
means an intermediate state between 
the much vaunted ‘autonomous 
individual’, the self-sufficient agent, and 
pure passivity. This is the state in which 
something is getting itself said in a 
discourse, or getting itself done in a 
series of actions, but it is impossible to 
identify the one doing it but it is 
happening. Something is happening in 
what is going on, but no one individual 
can be said to do it. For example, a 
promise is getting made in language with 
words like ‘democracy’ or ‘justice’ – but it 
is impossible to identify who is making 
the promise and impossible to deny that 
we are being given a promise. That is 
what Heidegger meant when he said 
‘language speaks’, although ‘democracy’ 
was not a word of promise for him as we 
all know. 
WD: Do you think there is a desire for 
bodies without flesh that is often 
operative in academic writing, which 
demands complete authorial control, 
and pursues the ideal of clarity (of 
making the fleshy matter of our language 
transparent for the sake of 
communicating meaning)? What would it 
mean to abdicate the assumed authority 
of the author and to admit one’s 
weakness? Are there ways that you try to 
perform this type of pedagogy in your 
own writing?  
JC: As I have just said, such authorial 
command is expected and it is therefore 
dangerous, especially for young 
professors, to assume a position of non-
knowing. But your question allows me to 
add an autobiographical point which 
may be of interest to others. When I 
started teaching, I was more interested 
in teaching than in publication, and I first 
felt impelled to publish in order not to 
perish, because it was expected of me. 
But I have always loved to write, ever 
since high school, where I learned I was 
a better writer than an athlete. So it was 
very easy, almost natural, that the work 
of publication took on a life of its own for 
me and I became quite swept up in it, 
which is one of the marks of the event. 
But it was not until I got to Radical 
Hermeneutics, where my first sustained 
encounter with Derrida took place, that I 
even conceived a desire to write 
differently, to push up against the limits 
of academic propriety. So Radical 
Hermeneutics, was something different 
for me, both in terms of style and of 
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content, of what I said, when I spoke for 
the first time in what Derrida would call 
a ‘circum-fessional’ way. This is seen 
clearly at the end when I say, we do not 
know who we are, none of us, not if we 
are honest, or whether we believe in 
God, or whether what we believe when 
we say ‘God’ is God at all. I make a 
confession of not knowing, a profession 
of learned ignorance. 
If you look at my first books, I was 
already very much interested in 
apophatic theology, but the authorial 
voice is different. It is much more the 
assured voice of the scholar, of the 
dispassionate investigator, of someone 
whose ‘research program’ is that of the 
relationship between philosophy and 
apophatic theology. The voice of Radical 
Hermeneutics is circum-fessional. I 
speak from the heart and I was criticized 
for this. An academic friend at a 
seminary once told me that when he 
read What Would Jesus Deconstruct? he 
said to himself, ‘that will preach’. This 
was meant as a congratulation, but for 
many, perhaps for most people, in the 
‘academic’ community, this would be an 
accusation, a violation of the protocol, a 
kind of pandering or purple prose, 
replacing thought with edification, etc. 
Am I to be ‘accused’ for what sometimes 
sounds like preaching – or 
congratulated? Should I, like Kierkegaard 
separate works of edification from the 
other works? I write in such a way that 
the objective and the edifying are 
mutually contaminated by the other. 
Each has its own danger, but I think that 
it is the one without the other that is 
most dangerous. I think that the 
‘homiletic’ is a risk, that the danger of 
preaching, is real but I think it is a 
salutary risk, because there is an 
opposite risk in simple academic 
propriety, which is greater. There is 
always something dangerously and 
instructively homiletic about the event, 
and in theology what is true of the event 
as such is all the more salient. 
At that point in my life, I was a tenured 
full professor and I was annoyed but 
unphased by such criticism. The only 
viable way for a young person, who still 
depends upon ‘peer review’, is to 
emphasize the learned in the learned 
ignorance and to make sure there are 
plenty of footnotes. In my own case, this 
was neither cowardly caution nor a 
cunning strategy. I was not waiting until I 
was in a protected position as a full 
professor. Before that, before I got to 
know Derrida well, I did not conceive or 
nourish a desire to write differently, 
which means for me at least to write 
more directly from the heart. It is this 
incommensurability of the ‘heart’ with 
the institutional system that, I think, is 
behind all your questions. 
WD: In your more recent work you have 
noted the uncanny resonance between 
the medieval theological imaginary 
concerning bodies without flesh (in both 
resurrected bodies and angels) and 
recent scientific breakthroughs in the 
fields like robotics, biological 
engineering, and computer technology.4 
As you observe, these technological 
breakthroughs are often accompanied 
by hopes of bodies without suffering, 
individuals without place, and of life 
without death. Computer technology is 
																																								 																				
4 See, for example, John D. Caputo (2010), ‘Bodies 
Still Unrisen, Events Still Unsaid: A Hermeneutic 
of Bodies without Flesh’, in Apophatic Bodies: 
Negative Theology, Incarnation and Relationality, 
ed. Chris Boesel and Catherine Keller, New York: 
Fordham University Press, 94-116; and (2011) ‘On 
the Wings of Angels: Post-humanism and Info-
technotheology’, The Twenty-Sixth Annual 
Symposium of The Simon Silverman 
Phenomenology Center, ed. Jeffrey McCurry, 
Pittsburgh: The Simon Silverman Phenomenology 
Center Duquesne University, 8-28. 
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already transforming the organization 
and practices of the contemporary 
classroom, sometimes locating the entire 
educational experience within the virtual 
domain of the internet. In what ways do 
you think that these technological 
changes hold the risk of seeking to form 
bodies without flesh? Could fears about 
such changes simply be a repetition of 
the ‘metaphysics of presence’? Does this 
technology also hold promise of 
transformation and hospitality? 
JC: This is a complicated question and it 
is one that I am still thinking about. I 
keep promising to say what I have to say 
in a book on bodies without flesh, which 
I keep postponing. In the simplest terms, 
it is the problem of the dangerous 
supplement. My point of departure for 
this discussion has been to develop the 
analogy between the new information 
technologies and the figure of the angel, 
which I first learned from Michel Serres’ 
book on angels. What is the angel 
(angelos, messenger) if not an instant 
message system? When the Lord God 
needs to get an instant message to 
Abraham to stay the patriarch’s hand, 
and there is no time to lose, he sends 
his angel. Nowadays the Most High could 
have used an iPhone. The analogy is 
elaborate. It is not just ‘information’, a 
word about which you and Heidegger are 
very suspicious, but also ‘guidance’ 
(guardian angels, global positioning 
systems), war (warrior angels like Michael 
and ‘smart bombs’), and interestingly the 
nature of the ‘body’ itself. Thomas 
Aquinas said angels are purely 
immaterial, not bodies at all, while the 
Franciscans said they were made of 
some kind of ethereal matter, which is 
quite like what I call bodies without flesh. 
On this point, the Franciscans are more 
interesting because today, in age of 
quantum physics and relativity, the very 
meaning of matter, space and time have 
been thrown in question, thoroughly 
revolutionized, which is why it is 
nonsense to say that science does not 
think. It may very well be that what we 
call ‘matter’ in ordinary experience 
comes down to vibrating filaments called 
superstrings, which is not so very far 
from the image that the Franciscans had 
of angelic bodies. The old mockery of 
medieval angelology, how many angels 
can dance on the head of a pin, has a 
close contemporary counterpart in 
computer miniaturization: how much 
information can be stored on a 
microchip the size of a pinhead? Mock 
that! In both cases, medieval Franciscan 
angelology and contemporary info-
technology, the model of the body is 
pure agency, action and activity, 
insulated from suffering and even 
mortality itself. 
The advances made by science and 
technology are steady, swift and 
irreversible (unless we blow ourselves off 
the face of the earth). They are changing 
everything and pushing up against the 
horizons or thresholds of our very 
carnality and mortality, producing a 
series of what Donna Haraway calls 
‘border breakdowns’. The seemingly 
crazy sci-fi idea which we see in 
Battlestar Galactica (the new series, 
2002-2005) of ‘downloading’ ‘conscious-
ness’ onto computer chips and 
‘uploading’ it into shiny new robot bodies 
(which would mean that one could store 
a back up ‘copy’ of yourself in case of an 
accident or computer crash) is actually 
being pursued by perfectly respectable 
scientists. I am not a specialist in the 
analysis of popular culture, but I find 
Battlestar Galactica quite instructive in 
this regard. The new technologies are 
meant to be supplements but they 
threaten to take over, like the ‘Cylons’ 
who were created by humans but who 
overtake their human creators. The 
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obvious ‘battle’ in the title, then, is this 
war between the humans and the 
Cylons, whom (which?) the humans mock 
by calling them ‘toasters’, stupid 
machines. This is something that always 
comes up, the fear that we will be 
enslaved by our own creation. But there 
are several other battles going on in this 
series that I find instructive. One of the 
more interesting things is that the Cylons 
have the ability to synthesize human 
bodies for themselves, which they do in 
order to infiltrate the human race and 
spy on them. But in the process of so 
doing they discover human feelings and 
the pleasures of the human flesh. Then 
the Cylons have another battle on their 
hands, between their rationally 
programmed Cylon self and loyalties to 
their ‘race’ and their acquired human 
feelings and passions, making them 
something of a ‘monstrous compound’, 
we might say. The quite voluptuous 
woman in red on the cover of the CD 
collection is a Cylon and her sensuality is 
central to the story, as is the sympathy of 
another Cylon character whose 
‘sympathies’ lie with the humans. When 
the Cylons assume human form, they 
expose themselves to human suffering 
and death. It is possible to kill a Cylon, 
but only temporarily, as he or she will be 
reduplicated and in the process get very 
annoyed at you for being put through 
such a painful ordeal. The suggestion is 
that even were info-technology to realize 
this seeming fantasy, it would retain the 
life of flesh as an available option, almost 
like a vacation one would take or 
nostalgic visit to an outdoor museum 
like Williamsburg, Virginia, which tries to 
reproduce a by-gone world. The 
pleasures of the flesh are made 
available, and even death and suffering 
are possible, but they are reduced to 
strictly temporary inconveniences. Finally, 
and this is also very interesting, the 
battle between the humans and the 
Cylons is also theological. They both have 
religions and occasionally they argue 
about theology. The Cylons are 
monotheists while the humans are 
polytheists, which suggests that religion 
survives even when ‘consciousness’ is 
digitalized, where it takes a monotheistic 
form, while ‘flesh’ is polytheistic. That is 
worth thinking about. 
The current transformations taking place 
in info-technology are deeply 
confounding. What we can be sure of is 
that everything we think about birth and 
death, about sickness and health, about 
materiality and carnality, sexuality and 
gender, will be affected, and maybe even 
totally transformed or even ‘overcome’. 
We are approaching a technological 
‘event’ which, interestingly, has been 
dubbed the ‘singularity’, using a word 
(inadvertently of course) that has a 
special prestige in continental 
philosophy, to describe a radical 
technological transformation that will 
render debates like the current one 
between zoe and bios obsolete and 
parochial. Here would be the ultimate 
body without flesh, pure deathless 
agents, achieved not by the ‘resurrection 
of the body’ but by information 
technology; theology, angelology is 
realized by technology. But is this truly 
an ‘event’? The futurists and the sci-fi 
writers can see it coming already. They 
say the singularity is near, and some 
techno-apocalyptic prophets even have a 
date in mind, predicting it will take place 
in 2045. So it is not an event. But what is 
coming, perhaps, is a change so vast and 
transforming that we cannot see what it 
is that we think we see coming. That 
would be the event. Furthermore, if we 
object that this will be a disaster, that 
does not mean it is not an event. There 
is nothing about the idea of the event 
that says it will not be a disaster; indeed 
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the event is constituted by the risk of 
disaster. 
Now, as professors of the ‘humanities’, 
you are asking what are we to do? We 
cannot afford, as a pragmatic matter, to 
be reactionary and to fall behind the 
pace of change or we will quickly fall out 
of touch with our students. My little four 
year old grandchild is completely 
comfortable with remote controls and 
touch-screens. Whether we like it or not, 
we must incorporate the new 
technologies as far as possible into the 
classroom, with all the attendant dangers 
this poses. As a theoretical matter, we – 
and here I have particularly in mind 
those of us in the ‘humanities’ – must 
get past obsolete ideas of science as 
atoms-in-a-void mechanism and come 
to grips with the profoundly revolutionary 
character of contemporary speculative 
physics. As a curricular matter, I think 
this means we need to make sure that 
humanities students get a level of 
scientific education that is at least at the 
level of being able to read the works of 
people like Brian Greene. One cannot 
understand these matters thoroughly 
without mathematics, but there is a great 
deal we can and must understand. There 
are ‘picture theorists’ and ‘equation 
theorists’ and we can understand the 
‘picture theorists’. Sean Carroll, one of 
the popular expositors of these ideas, 
puts the equations in the footnotes. 
But where is the ‘event’ in this amazing 
scene? Does the coming of the new 
technologies spell the death of the 
‘teacher’, of the person to person 
contact, of students touched by teachers 
who have been touched by the event? 
We cannot imagine that happening but it 
is a real threat. ‘Distance learning’ means 
one learns in isolation, by staying at 
home, on a computer, removed from 
human contact. This has many 
advantages for many people in different 
situations but it is also very dangerous, 
threatening to produce atomized, 
unsocialized and unhappy people and 
stunted learning, learning without heart. 
Do the new technologies induce the 
illusory ideal of the perfectly 
programmed autonomous self, a digital 
version of Descartes’ res cogitans? That 
is also a real risk. But the risk will not be 
averted by cupping our ears and saying 
that science does not think. It will be 
averted by understanding science better 
and differently and by abandoning this 
reactionary slogan. For those of us who 
are interested in religion, I think that the 
right posture has been struck by the 
Dalai Lama, who loves contemporary 
physics and sees all kinds of 
convergences between his meditative life 
and speculative physics, where he thinks 
that what we call the ‘mystery of Being’ is 
alive and well and flourishing. Please do 
not tell me that these are ‘problems’ not 
‘mysteries’, which I think is a kind of 
postmodern dualism. These are 
investigations into the very make up of 
matter, time and space that leave us 
breathless. Of course these 
mathematical problems are problems, 
but they are also mysteries and they are 
latent with the event. That is why I think 
that continental philosophers must look 
to new models, to people like Catherine 
Malabou, whose work represents 
something genuinely continental but 
importantly new, and Zizek, despite his 
outrageous caricatures of what he calls 
postmodernism, and Michel Serres and 
Bruno Latour, who was deeply influenced 
by Serres. When Malabou discusses the 
neurosciences in terms of ‘plasticity’, and 
when Zizek speaks in terms of parallax 
shifts and the non-all, and when Latour 
describes the historical construction of 
the natural sciences, they provide 
openings within which the event can 
take place. In my recent work, The 
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Insistence of God, I have tried to think 
the event as an event of grace, and to 
extend this model beyond a theopoetics 
to what I call a cosmo-poetics, where I 
treat the sheer stupid luck of life on 
earth, a completely fortuitous happening, 
cosmically speaking, as the stupidity of 
grace, the grace of the event. It just 
might be that God does play dice with 
the world, or rather, since God is not an 
agent who does things like play dice, it is 
better to say that the dice game, the 
being-played of the dice game, in the 
middle voice, which is not being played 
by someone, the element of play or 
chance, or what Derrida calls the 
‘perhaps’, peut-être, is the divine element 
in things. This I believe was first pointed 
out by Heraclitus, in a saying that was 
beautifully interpreted by Heidegger in 
the same book in which he frets over the 
age of ‘information’. 
WD: I must confess that the recent 
findings of the natural sciences that have 
gripped my imagination speak of a 
different future. The emerging accounts 
of global climate change seem to 
confront us with the material realities 
and limitations of human life. In this case 
it is the presumption of science – or its 
use by other cultural forces – that there 
are no limits to what we are capable of 
that have led to immense destruction 
and waste. So I wonder if this notion that 
our material limits are coming undone is 
more the business of science fiction than 
of an inevitable future. When my 
physicist brother and I have our 
perennial science versus theology 
debates I like to chide him that I am still 
waiting for the flying cars and 
teleportation devices. All I have seen 
coming out in my lifetime are smaller 
computers, bigger televisions, and wider 
varieties of Viagra. So when we look to 
the future, should we assume that 
everything is up for grabs, or is there not 
a demand that we begin to take certain 
limits seriously? 
The in-breaking of the event in our 
future, then, might be less the possibility 
of angelic bodies, and more a matter of 
the unpleasant reminder of our flesh – of 
our frailty and vulnerability. In this 
configuration, philosophy might not 
simply need to study up on the natural 
sciences, but it might provide resources 
that would help people cultivate simpler 
forms of living. This might mean that 
theology needs to be less systematic and 
more ascetical (while remaining skeptical 
of old modes of discipline and 
formation). So might there, then, be a 
different Franciscan legacy – one not of 
angels but of apostolic living – that is 
needed to accompany the findings of 
science? 
JC: Your anxieties are well founded. As I 
said above, nothing guarantees that the 
event will not be a disaster. The event is 
the very possibility of disaster. So your 
anxiety is integral to the picture I have 
just been imagining. My guess is that, 
although I have not done an empirical 
survey on this matter, the scientists are 
on your side. It is they who brought the 
threat of global warming to our attention 
before anyone noticed it and they who 
have been alarmed and who can prove 
we have reason to be alarmed. The roots 
of the problem are multiple. It is first of 
all the cooptation of science by techno-
capitalism, the vast amount of money 
that is to be made by exploiting the 
environment, and the politicians whom 
that money has baldly, brazenly bought. 
It is also the refusal of the people who 
live in the technologically advanced 
societies to restrain their indulgence, and 
so you are right to call for a new kind of 
asceticism. And we cannot forget it is 
also the result of very poor people in 
poor nations to get out of poverty by 
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exploiting their national resources. The 
solution is to be found in the optimal 
mix of conservation and vigorous 
research into new clean technologies. 
That would require a degree of 
enlightenment in public policy that we 
find impossible to imagine in the 
degraded politics of today, where the 
common good is up for sale to the 
highest bidder. I myself am worried that 
the steady advance of miniaturization 
along with Moore’s Law, that we double 
computer capacity about every two 
years, is hastening the advent of hand-
held nuclear weapons, which will make it 
all but impossible to prevent a 
catastrophe. 
I am trying to imagine the ‘to come’, 
what today many theorists do not shirk 
from calling the ‘post-human’ age, or 
what Donna Haraway called the coming 
age of ‘cyborgs’, in which the rigorous 
distinction between the human and the 
technological breaks down, which is also 
a point upon which Derrida has insisted 
right from the start. But I am not 
endorsing everything I can see coming in 
this future we cannot see coming. What 
you are saying tests the faith that I have 
in what Derrida once said, that ‘the 
future is always better’, not because it is, 
which is certainly false, but because that 
is our hope, our faith. So this is a hope 
against hope, a faith in something 
impossible to believe, which is what faith 
and hope are, just the way love means 
loving the unlovable, loving the enemy. I 
think that what we have called God up to 
now means a kind of immensity against 
which we measure ourselves and then 
feel our finitude and mortality. I think 
that the work of that immensity, that 
infinity, is now done by the infinitival ‘to 
come’, the vastness of what lies before 
us in history but also, as we are 
beginning to realize, in the universe, in 
universes endlessly spawning other 
universes. The more we learn, the more 
we should appreciate our limits. Science 
is on your side; it tells us we are very 
finite, all headed for entropic oblivion. 
Even were we in some unimaginable 
future to come up with robot bodies and 
manage someday to escape the earth, 
that would be temporary – we can run 
but not hide from entropy. N. T. Wright 
tells us that the coming heaven is 
actually earth, that when Jesus comes 
again, we will not go up to heaven, but 
he will come down to rule here on earth. 
Therefore we should conserve the earth. 
Well, I agree we should conserve the 
earth, with or without this story, but even 
that would provide only a temporary 
residence for Jesus, since in five hundred 
million years or so the earth will be toast! 
I think we should see our lives on this 
little corner of the universe as an event 
of grace, the grace of an event, a lucky 
break – the stupidity of grace – nothing 
but a passing moment in the immense 
history of something, we know not what. 
In the meantime, we should show some 
gratitude for this grace and foresight 
about the planet we leave to our children 
and grandchildren. But I think that 
science gives us new reasons for saying 
that. I think that science is on the side of 
the philosophers, accompanying them, 
as you say. 
 WD:  In a recent essay, ‘Theopoetics as 
Radical Theology’, you differentiate 
between confessional theology – which 
‘reports back’ to religious communities – 
and radical or postmodern theology that 
reports back to the academy. Surely, this 
relationship with the academy is one 
that is fraught with ambiguity. In Radical 
Hermeneutics, for example, you spoke of 
the necessity for reason and 
philosophers to be ‘able to slip back and 
forth’ between the confines of an 
institutional setting and roaming freely 
on the streets (characterizing these two 
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possibilities as ‘forms of life’) (Caputo 
1987: 228-9). What is the relationship 
between theology and the academy, and 
in what ways does embracing the task of 
theology (rather than just philosophy) 
make this slipping back and forth 
between both more necessary and more 
difficult?  
JC: Yes, there is ambiguity from 
beginning to end and it is precisely the 
ambiguity that allows for the event, and it 
is precisely the event that calls for the 
nimbleness of slipping back and forth. To 
answer this question, let me start by 
saying that I like this expression ‘reports 
back’ because it suggests the circle of an 
economy, reminding us that the 
‘expenditure without return’ is inevitably 
drawn back into a certain ‘contract’, and 
hence is expected to return a dividend 
after all. The ambiguity is that there is no 
question or possibility of simply leaving 
an economy behind; the question is 
rather of making economies more open-
ended and flexible and less contracting. 
When I say that radical theologians 
report back to the academy I am saying 
this as a reminder, a qualification, which 
comes after first contrasting them with 
confessional theologians. The latter do 
theology within certain confessional 
constraints and their livelihood (and 
sometimes even their very life) depends 
upon the ability of the community to 
recognize itself in their work. By contrast, 
the ‘radical’ theologian seems free as a 
bird, no bishops, no excommunications, 
no heresy trials. But then to be free as a 
bird is an illusion, even for the bird itself, 
as Kant once pointed out, since the bird 
is inclined to feel the wind by which its 
flight is sustained as a resistance without 
which it could fly all the more freely. For 
if the truth to be told, when we speak of 
radical theologians, if we started to make 
a list, we would find that virtually all of 
them have day jobs as academics, which 
presumes they are lucky enough to find 
a job. So even though they do not have 
to report back to a confessional 
community, that does not mean they do 
not report back to anyone. They do not 
have to deal with bishops but they do 
have to deal with search committees, 
tenure committees and deans. They do 
not have heresy trials, but they do have 
‘referees’ who read the manuscripts they 
submit for publication and scrutinize 
them for ‘errors’ of method or content, 
which makes for a certain counterpart to 
the Vatican’s ‘Syllabus of Errors’. 
Both the confessional theologians and 
the radical theologians are in an 
‘ambiguous’ position. It is never a 
question of simply and unambiguously 
leaving behind an economy but of 
making the economy more open-ended 
and auto-revising, of giving economy a 
chance, as Derrida says. Give economy a 
break and do not dismiss it as the work 
of the devil. Construct an economy that 
allows for the event. Of course, that is a 
paradox, since it demands that we 
provide for the unforeseeable, which is a 
grammatical contradiction as well as a 
real one, since to provide is to foresee. 
So we are always negotiating these 
ambiguities, everyone, not just 
theologians. 
The confessional theologians know about 
the need for constant negotiation very 
well. I say this because their work, when 
it is sustained and earnest, very often 
causes them to test confessional limits, 
think up against the borders of the 
community, skirting the edge of ‘heresy’. 
My own explanation for this is that 
radical theology is implicit in 
confessional theology, that when we dig 
deeply enough, we find it lying there in 
wait for the confessional theologians to 
stumble upon it, expose it, expound it 
and maybe even espouse it, and when 
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they do that, it can cost them their jobs. 
Radical theology spooks the confessional 
theologian, and the confessional 
theologian spook their communities, and 
ideally this can take place without a 
heresy trial or exorcists to drive out the 
spooks. Many confessional theologians 
reach a point where they say things like, 
‘we do not know what we mean when 
say “God”’. They are not saying this in a 
safe way, as a higher form of praise for 
God, but they are saying, we really do not 
know what we mean. Perhaps it is an 
illusion, a neurosis, a projection, etc., and 
this ‘we do not know’ qualifies everything 
else we say. If they say this clearly and 
publically they risk the wrath of the 
community. Elizabeth Johnson, a 
distinguished Catholic theologian at 
Fordham University, has recently run 
afoul of the American Catholic bishops. 
This is testimony to the authoritarianism 
and ignorance of the bishops and it has 
managed to make them look even worse 
than they did before, if such a thing were 
possible after the recent scandals by 
which the Church has been engulfed. In 
the course of this controversy a 
spokesman for the Bishops said that 
theologians are sometimes a ‘curse and 
a plague upon the Church’. That to me is 
a sign that the theologians are doing 
their job. To be a curse upon such power 
is a blessing and the church should be 
always grateful for blessings.  
The radical theologians on the other 
hand are negotiating with the disciplinary 
systems of the university, with external 
systems like the politics of state 
supported public universities or of the 
wealth of donors to private universities, 
but also with systems internal to their 
discipline, like the normalizing force of 
the scholarly protocols, of standards for 
tenure and promotion, the standards of 
journals and academic presses, 
professional societies, and the rest. This 
is another kind of orthodoxy, to be sure, 
but it is real. One must meet certain 
standards, submit to a ‘discipline’. It is 
not an accident that we use the same 
word to describe both an ominous 
‘disciplinary’ power, a force of 
normalization, and to describe our 
chosen field of study, the ‘discipline’ we 
love and to which we devote our lives. 
One must learn to operate within the 
university. That is not the devil. It is only 
diabolical if it is totalizing, if it encloses 
everything, for then the system will only 
produce clones, more of the same. Then 
there is no event. So I would advocate 
the ‘weakness of the university’, meaning 
that the system, the discipline must be 
weak, open-ended, pliable, reinventable, 
which means eventive, while the 
individuals are called upon to be bold, 
inventive, reinventive. Sometimes bold 
young people can break the molds and 
still manage to break into the system. 
More often, I am inclined to think, there 
is a sliding scale here, that with each 
step along the academic way, each 
hurdle scaled on the academic path, the 
more freedom there will be to speak and 
write and act differently, to blur 
established disciplinary borders. The idea 
is to violate academic protocols but not 
to simply smash them, neither idolatory 
nor sheer iconoclasm. As Aristotle says 
about the phronimos, we start by 
imitating the one with mastery, and his 
example is learning archery by first 
imitating the skilled archer. Or we can 
use the example of a good metaphor: we 
bend the rules, shock the system of 
established use, while drawing upon the 
resources of the very system we are 
shocking, which we must first learn. First 
the camel, then the lion, then the child, 
Zarathustra says. 
Now what I am saying holds true for 
every academic, not just for academic 
theologians, confessional or radical. But I 
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think it is especially true, or let us say 
revealingly true – it’s a revelation! – in 
the case of theologians because what 
they are talking about, theos, God, is in 
an especially poignant way not reducible 
to an object of disinterested scholarly 
research. I hasten to add that such 
disinterest is an illusion in any research, 
any discipline. Latour shows that Louis 
Pasteur was deeply and passionately 
devoted to his faith in microbes (and in 
protecting public health)! God or 
microbes, either one, spells passion. But 
it is easier to see with God. The name of 
God is the name of an event, or of a 
deed, Johannes Climacus said, to quote 
a hero you and I share. That means it is 
a matter of life and death, of what Tillich 
called a matter of ‘ultimate concern’; it 
touches upon the passion of our lives. I 
think of ‘God’ in terms of the event, and I 
think of the ‘event’ in terms of God, 
because I think each is in a certain way 
a helpful paradigm for the other. ‘God’ 
signifies the claiming power of the event, 
its power to address us, but the event 
signifies that God is a weak force, that 
God’s power is a weak force because it is 
the power of a claim, a call, an invitation, 
a solicitation, an ‘insistence’, but without 
an army to enforce it. Calls can always 
be ignored. The event signifies what is 
going on, what insists, in the name of 
God; it means that the name of God is 
not the name of a being that does things 
but the name of a claiming event. So 
‘God’ and ‘event’ are each in their own 
way paradigmatic of something that is 
going on not only in ‘theology’ but 
everywhere, in the other ‘disciplines’, and 
outside academic life, which is why the 
event that overtakes us when we use the 
name (of) ‘God’ can take place with or 
without religion. 
I think the question you are raising, all 
your questions, circulate around the 
tension between the event and the 
‘object’, purely objective, disinterested 
thinking, which I think is what ‘secular’ 
would finally mean. In that case, the 
event is the ultimate resistance to the 
‘object’ and ‘secularism’. Were there to 
be such a thing as a pure object, that 
would mean something devoid of an 
event, and that would be possible only if 
we were dead. Objective thinking means, 
we try to think of how things are if or 
when we are dead. This has its place. I 
am not trying to run it off the grounds. I 
am just trying to stop it from taking over 
and driving everything non-objective off 
the grounds. I am trying to prevent it 
from preventing the event. So the event 
means how things lay claim to us while 
we are still alive, how they call upon or 
are visited upon the living, who are of 
course living mortals. Things happen in 
our lives by the event. By the impossible, 
Derrida says, things begin, in whatever 
order – art, science, ethics, politics, 
religion, no matter what, inside or 
outside the university, inside or outside 
what we call in Christian Latin ‘religion’. 
There is always the event and the 
university is the assembly, the collegium, 
of those who have been overtaken by the 
event. Everything really important in our 
lives happens by the event and in that 
sense, to come back to your first 
question, there can be no purely secular 
university. We have never been secular. 
Secularity will set in only about fifteen 
minutes or so after we are dead. 
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